Empowerment as contested terrain: employability of the Dutch workforce by Pruijt, Hans & Yerkes, Mara A.
1 
 
Empowerment as Contested Terrain. Employability of the Dutch workforce. 
 
Hans Pruijt 
Mara Yerkes 
2013 - Submitted for publication in European Societies 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam Pruijt@fsw.eur.nl 
 
 
Abstract 
Sociological analysis has mainly portrayed empowerment as a manipulative masking discourse. 
However, various actors in society view it as the opposite of domination and espouse it as a goal. 
Empowerment can constitute a discursive field shaped by its internal contractions between autonomy 
and control, between ambition and risk of programmed failure – exacerbated by the emphasis on 
responsibility, and between focus and stigmatization. The paper presents a case study of employability 
policy in the Netherlands. Employability can be seen as empowerment in matters of career. The study is 
based  on  41  interviews  with  policy  makers,  managers,  union  and  employers’  leaders  and  politicians.  It  
shows that actors drawing on the principle of empowerment as a goal in itself can reset or reclaim a 
drifting empowerment project in its inceptive phase and add their own twist during execution, 
evaluation and efforts to engineer improvements. 
 
Introduction 
Empowerment, the idea that people should be enabled to take control themselves, is an 
important paradigm of our time. It is the basis of various frames that are designed to organize 
experience  by  simplifying  and  condensing  aspects  of  ‘the  world  out  there’,  to  find  resonance  
and to guide action (Benford, 2000). Employability policy, the empirical focus of this paper, can 
be seen as such an empowerment frame (Pruijt and Dérogée, 2010). The message is that 
employers can no longer offer job security and that employability enhancement, i.e. investment 
in skills, knowledge, insights and contacts, is the solution. Other examples of empowerment 
frames are the ‘enabling’ welfare state, student-directed learning and anti-Taylorist job 
redesign. It is the idea of empowerment which is essential here, regardless of whether the word 
‘empowerment’  itself is used or not. 
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Analytical approaches to empowerment frames are hampered by conceptual problems. This is 
understandable, because sociology is preoccupied with constraints. As Smith and Fetner 
(2007:13) note, the task of sociology is to study how individuals’  freedom  is  limited  by  forces  
that shape actions and beliefs. Concepts that concern the removal of constraints do not sit well 
with this preoccupation. Thus we often see empowerment frames analyzed as disguised control 
devices. Smith (2010: 294) notes that employability discourse prescribes how employees should 
construct and manipulate themselves, for example by constructing their work history as a series 
of projects instead of positions held, by downplaying any preference for stability and by 
engaging  in  ‘identity  work’,  a  kind  of  emotional  labor,  to  act  out  the  dynamism  of  the  free  agent  
in the new economy. She argues that it conveys the belief that success and failure are only 
attributable  to  ‘our  capacity  (or  lack  thereof)  for  personal  growth  and self-empowerment’,  an  
outlook  that  normalizes  ‘the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  flexible,  unpredictable  economy’  and  
fails  to  ‘challenge  the  structurally  created  inequalities’.  Hallier  (2009)  suggests  that  
employability policy obscures the possibilities for collective identification with a group and 
collective action. A further critique is that in employability discourse, only the supply side, i.e. 
the skills and other qualifications that people bring to the market, receive consideration 
(McQuaid and Lindsay 2005: 204-205). This critique implies that the employability discourse 
obscures how people may or may not get the opportunity to put these skills and qualifications 
into action; employees are blamed for stumbling on structural obstacles. When people fail, the 
discourse puts the blame on them, although a lack of employment opportunity might be the 
real cause of failure (Hallier and Butts 1999). Jacobsson (2004) notes that the concept of 
employability figures in a discourse that can be seen as inducing people to feel individually 
responsible for macro-economic problems. 
Theoretically, however, there are reasons to doubt whether empowerment will necessarily turn 
out to be a disguised control device. After all, empowerment exists as a goal in itself. This goal 
can be defined as being the opposite of domination. It is espoused in social movements and by 
various other actors across society (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992; Stewart 2000). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that an empowerment frame, by providing a 
set of simple oppositions, can constitute a discursive field that enables the creation of a range 
of meanings that are recognized as appropriate to be discussed (Spillman, 1995) and allows 
participants to engage in contests of meaning (Snow, 2007). Empirically, the target case for this 
exploration is the employability debate in the Netherlands. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. First, the paper outlines the theoretical reasoning behind the idea that an 
empowerment frame can open up a discursive field structured by the internal contradictions of 
empowerment. This sets the stage for the analysis of the empirical case of employability policy 
in the Netherlands.  
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Theoretical exploration of the internal contradictions of empowerment 
The starting point for our theoretical exploration is the observation that empowerment is 
fraught with contradictions. These contradictions become salient when considering that 
empowerment is an asymmetric relationship. Cruikshank (1999) theorizes empowerment as a 
power relationship in which knowledgeable actors induce others, deemed to be lacking in 
autonomy, to want to become active, self-policing, responsible citizens. Cruikshank hints at 
various contradictions by claiming that ‘the will to empower contains the twin possibilities of 
domination and freedom’ (1999: 2) and ‘the will to empower is neither clearly liberatory nor 
clearly repressive’ (1999: 72).  
Cruikshank suggests that actors in the field of empowerment based anti-poverty policy 
consciously experienced such contradictions or tensions, which had an effect on the shape of 
anti-poverty programs. She notes that ‘the danger was to encroach upon individual freedom by 
acting too much or too little. Hence, self-help schemes underwent constant revisions and 
reform’ (1999: 54) and that ‘the will to empower, or the desire to help the poor, had to be 
balanced against the imperative that the poor must help themselves. The subjectivity of the 
poor had to be balanced against their subjection’ (1999: 74). We can distinguish at least three 
different internal contradictions that involve potentially self-negating aspects of 
empowerment. 
As stated above, the empowerment relationship is asymmetric. This implies that there is a 
contradiction between autonomy and control. The asymmetrical relationship is essential to 
empowerment. Otherwise, we are simply dealing with freedom from interference and there 
would be no need to invoke the concept of empowerment. This asymmetrical relationship 
involves control in the form of regulation, management or influence. In other words, there is 
structural and/or normative control. This relational aspect clashes, to a variable degree, with 
autonomy. This is similar to what has been called the paradox of positive freedom (Carter 
2003). Fromm (1942: 232) defines positive freedom as ‘the full realization of the individual's 
potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously.’ A further 
characteristic of positive freedom is that it is seen as something that only exists when it is being 
exercised (Carter 2003). Positive  freedom  comes  with  expectations  about  what  someone  else’s  
self-realization should entail; it is charged with morality (Berlin 1969: 124-131). In a debate on 
empowerment, this contradiction makes two positions possible. One can argue for little control 
to minimize the clash with autonomy, or criticize a given initiative for being more a form of 
discipline or coercion than empowerment. Conversely, one could argue that too little control 
contributes to passivity among those to be empowered. We will refer to this contradiction as 
the control contradiction. 
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A second contradiction involves risk and ambition. Empowerment frames challenge people to 
undertake some sort activity that pushes their limits and is thereby risky. If the desired results 
materialize, this imparts a sense of do-it-yourself accomplishment. Such an experience of 
success boosts learning, awareness of acquired capabilities and energy and thereby reinforces 
the transformation process (Morgan 1997: 198-199). But failure can cause an empowerment 
frame to backfire because it emphasizes responsibility. In the extreme case, an empowerment 
frame can entice people to start on an impossible mission that can end with them blaming 
themselves for problems beyond their control. Thus, the realism of empowerment schemes and 
the risk of programmed failure are a basis for debate. A potential issue is how much risk 
individuals face. For example, in the shape of exposure to market forces, how much risk should 
vulnerable people take and how much protection is required? And, in the case where the 
empowerment relationship entails the provision of resources, one may question whether these 
resources are adequate to limit the risk of failure. Finally, given initiatives might be criticized for 
not showing enough ambition, i.e. for staying too much on the safe side. We propose to term 
this contradiction the risk contradiction. 
A third contradiction exists between focus and stigmatization. A key element in the 
empowerment relationship is that those to be empowered are deemed to be lacking in 
autonomy or self-sufficiency. This entails a risk of stigmatization, and labeling those to be 
empowered as deficient can hardly be empowering. An obvious strategy to deal with this is to 
define a wide target group for an empowerment initiative. However, defining a very wide target 
group might not be attractive when resources are scarce or when legitimization requires a 
target group that can be classified as needy. The absence of a clearly defined target group may 
also make it difficult to develop a coherent strategy. We will refer to this contradiction as the 
targeting contradiction. 
The risk of stigmatization, a high level of control and programmed failure are not mutually 
exclusive. The theoretical possibility exists that an empowerment scheme is criticized because it 
declares a targeted group of people to be unfit, then forces them try something that is bound 
to fail, which ultimately leads to them blaming themselves for the failure.  
Thus, there are theoretical reasons for considering the possibility that empowerment can open 
up a discursive field, precisely because of its internal contradictions. This can especially be 
expected when actors are present who subscribe to empowerment as a goal. Logically, such 
actors should be relatively sensitive to any drift in the direction of increased control and/or 
selective targeting with their associated problems of stigmatization and/or an increased risk of 
programmed failure.  
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Method 
The case study is primarily based on a collection of verbatim transcripts of interviews made in 
2009 as part of study into the management of social risks in the Netherlands, with the aim to 
cover all actors and organizations that were involved in policy making from 1995 to 2009 
(Yerkes 2011).  
For the purposes of this paper, only parts of interview transcripts pertaining to the issue of 
employability were used, containing statements from 41 interviewees. Twelve interviewees 
were associated with trade unions, including the general trade union confederation FNV, the 
Christian confederation CNV and the federation of unions for middle and higher employees 
MHP. Seven of these interviewees were (former) union officials and five were (former) union 
representatives. Six interviews were used  from  employers’  associations,  including  two  officials  
and four (former) representatives. Further interviewees included three independent political 
advisors on the Social and Economic Council, an advisory body for the government; three 
representatives of consultative organizations (bipartite industrial relations organizations); seven 
(former) governmental policy makers, plus seven parliamentarians, including two from the 
social democratic PvdA, one from the green party GL, one from the conservative party VVD, 
two from the Christian-democratic CDA and one from the Christian party CU. In addition, 
interview fragments from three interviews with collective bargaining officials working for 
companies in the health care and transportation sectors were used.  
In the analysis no iterative coding procedure was used. The debate was reconstructed by 
following the temporal logic that was present in the case: after actors tried to make sense of 
the concept of employability and discussed its possibilities and risks, employability 
improvement efforts were institutionalized in collective bargaining agreements and 
employability programs. Actors evaluated these efforts, and used their evaluations as a basis 
for developing visions for future policies.  
Policy documents were also studied, but the interviews had the advantage of covering what 
was not included in final decisions and documents, and therefore contained viewpoints that 
had not fully appeared in print. A drawback of the research strategy, however, is that 
inequalities in power are not fully taken into account, an illusion might be produced that all 
viewpoints have equal weight.  
Several interviewees indicated that the information they gave was sensitive; for this reason 
respondents’ identities are not revealed. We can see this as enhancing the reliability of the 
account, because anonymity made it unnecessary for the interviewees to conform to the 
official viewpoints associated with the interests they represented. 
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Confusion and claims 
In the Netherlands, the adoption of the concept of employability required special interpretative 
effort because there was no straightforward Dutch translation for the term. Management 
consultants and employers defined it as inzetbaarheid, meaning physical and intellectual 
mobility, and a flexible attitude, thereby seeking to instrumentalize the concept (Pruijt and 
Dérogée, 2010). 
Within the Dutch trade union movement there was, initially, little enthusiasm for employability. 
The lack of enthusiasm was directly related to employability being perceived as a management 
tool, which was consistent with the way in which management consultants and employers 
interpreted it. Some union officials saw employability as a management strategy with the goal 
to adapt organizations to changes in the environment. The union movement felt employability 
was the opposite of job protection, and found that unions in the UK, where a strong 
employability discourse also existed, had made a similar assessment. In British union circles, 
employability was seen as diminishing  the  workers’ capability to resist, and was associated with 
labeling employees as unemployable.1 A former union leader recalled:2 
‘For a long time, employability has suffered from the effect of a false start. [..] For a long 
time there has been the suspicion  “you just mean layoffs”. [..] Employability was a 
debate  that  should  not  be  trusted.  It  started  as  an  employers’  issue,  and  because  of  this,  
it landed in a suspicious corner.’  
Thus the unions detected a drift in meaning toward more control and less protection in the 
employers’  and  consultants’  interpretation  of  the  original  idea  of  employability. As Hirschman 
(1970) reasoned, an actor faced with a decline has three options: loyalty, i.e. sitting it out, exit 
or voice. What followed was a process in which the union strategy changed from sitting it out to 
voice. Slowly, the idea emerged in union circles that the employability concept was too 
interesting to ignore. A trade union official reconstructed this as follows: 
‘We had a meeting with active members and discussed employability and what should 
we  do  with  it.  “Nothing”,  was  the  conclusion.  But  later  we  found  out  we  had  been  
talking to a group of people [..] who felt very secure, their jobs were not at risk. And 
later we had a discussion with another group, with a different composition and asked 
them:  “suppose  you  lose  your  job  [..],  where  does  that  leave  you  in  terms  of  the  labor  
market?”  That  prompted  us  to  take  it  up  as  a  policy  issue.’ (trade union official, CNV) 
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Some influential union officials argued  that  investing  in  employability  was  in  the  employees’  
best interest, and that the emergence of the employability concept was an opportunity to be 
seized upon by the unions. In essence, the unions chose the option of voice, which entailed  
embracing the concept of employability but defining it in their own terms. They wanted to 
express that employability is not a problem associated with employees contributing 
insufficiently to the organization, but rather, employability offers a means of creating security, 
given increasing disappearance of lifetime jobs.  
The end result was that the Dutch trade union confederation FNV concluded the term 
employability  could  be  translated  as  ‘weerbaarheid’,  which  means  the  ability  to  defend  oneself.  
FNV felt that an employability  policy  that  entailed  the  ‘empowerment  of  members,  to  be  in  
charge  of  their  lifetime  decisions,’  one  which  could  complement  traditional  collective  
protection, was possible (Sprenger and Van Klaveren 2004: 346). FNV established two leading 
principles for its employability policy. The first was that everything undertaken in the name of 
employability should be voluntary for employees. In terms of the control contradiction, this 
means that employability policy involves a certain amount of pressure on employees, at least 
normative pressure, to take control of their careers but not so much pressure that autonomy is 
lost.  The  second  principle  for  FNV’s  employability  policy  was  that  investment  in  employability  
should be timely. Timely in this case means long before redundancies appear imminent, and 
this implies that employability investments should not be tied to any planned job cuts. In terms 
of the targeting contradiction, this policy implies staying on the safe side by avoiding the 
disempowering effect of labeling employees who are about to lose their jobs as lacking in 
employability. 
This episode highlights a limitation of a deterministic, critical take on an empowerment frame 
as just a control tool: the possibilities in the discursive space seem limited to sitting it out or 
possibly exit. When the deterministic view is left behind, claims can be made on the basis of 
empowerment as a goal. 
Employers’  associations  and  unions,  working  together  in  the  Labor  Foundation  (a  bilateral  
institution that sets the collective bargaining agenda in the Netherlands), agreed to make 
enhancing employability a priority for the period 1997-2002. Employability became an 
institutionalized issue in collective bargaining, with training clauses becoming a standard 
feature in collective bargaining agreements. The proportion of collective agreements with 
specific clauses on employability investments, i.e. about non job-related training and the 
creation of personal development plans grew from 5.7% in 1995 to 31.4% in 2003 (Pruijt and 
Dérogée 2010). During negotiations, unions attempted to block all proposals linking 
employability investments to job cuts or dismissals. Vocational (re)training programs were set 
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up,  with  support  from  the  unions.  ‘Sector  funds’  were  created  in  industries  predominantly 
consisting of small and medium-sized business. These funds were used for a variety of activities, 
of which training was the most notable. Their main source of income was a percentage of the 
wage costs contributed by employers in a given industry. 
All these policies presumed the voluntary participation of employees, although HRM 
departments and the unions tried to exert influence on employees, i.e. a light version of 
control, also there was no direct link with the axing of jobs. This implies success for the strategy 
of voice adopted by the unions, which meant embracing the employability concept but giving it 
their own spin.  
 
Perceived passivity attributed to lack of moral virtue or to structural constraints  
Looking back on what had been tried and achieved, an array of respondents, including 
employers’  organization  representatives,  union  representatives,  and  experts,  all  pointed  to  
employees’  propensity  to  participate  in  training  as  a  bottleneck.  In other words, employees 
were found not to live up to the expectations that were embedded in employability policy. 
Thus, some disappointment was universal, but the ways in which respondents framed it 
differed.  
Some respondents expressed reproach. A  staff  member  at  an  employers’  association  said: 
‘Investing in people is something everybody is talking about: training. Nobody is against 
it but in practice it is difficult. How many people are really eager to participate in 
training?’  
A top level civil servant pointed to substantial unused opportunities: 
‘It is clear that quite a lot is being spent on training for employees. Employers pay for a 
lot of training, and there are many sector-based training funds that have the problem of 
not being able to spend all their money rather than being overwhelmed by employees 
who are eager to participate in training.’ 
He based his assessment partly on his knowledge of a large telecom operator, where the top HR 
manager, himself adamant about investing in employability, had told him: 
‘Training is great, and we offer a lot of training and pay for all of it. We have only one 
problem: employees do not want to participate.’ 
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As an explanation, he indicated that many employees have a ‘reversed fear’ about their 
employability and think that: 
‘The more employable I become, the  greater the chance that I will be the first one to be 
laid off. And if I just stay put, my redundancy payment increases every year, making it 
more  difficult  to  dismiss  me.  I’ll  stay  comfortably  put  and  the  young  ones  will  be  out.’ 
A Christian-democratic Member of Parliament noted that the culture in the Netherlands is such 
that once someone has obtained a professional diploma, this signals the end of training. An 
exception to this  are professions where continued training is mandatory, as is the case for 
health care professionals. He said very few people voluntarily sit down with books to study and 
update their professional knowledge. For respondents who expressed reproach, the 
employees’  propensity  to  engage  in  training  seems  to be a moral issue. When they referred to 
the context, it was to a permissive context in which there were no penalties attached to 
training aversion. Logically, such an analysis leads to proposed improvements that focus on 
increased control and/or less protection. 
There is also a very different discourse present in the interviews: one that avoids morality and 
focuses on causal explanations of employee behavior. This narrative does not signal a problem 
that  could  have  been  solved  by  increasing  control  over  employees’  behavior.  A manager in the 
transport industry reflected on employability policy against the backdrop of initiatives 
undertaken in her company to enhance the employability of low-skilled staff with physically 
demanding tasks: 
‘It is a completely theoretical exercise. We have everything. [..] We have career scans, 
we have health scans, we have career guidance, we have evening classes, training, name 
it.  But  that  is  not  the  cause.  People  just  don’t  do  it.  [..]  How do we get people to the 
point that they start using it? How do you make people realize, when they start working, 
that they should not and can not continue in this work until they are sixty-five?’ 
She added that that in her company, money is never the problem. Managers are required to 
discuss training with each staff member on an annual basis and the company covers all training 
costs in both time and money. Nevertheless, few employees participate in training 
opportunities offered by the company. However, she did not simply blame the employees, but 
acknowledged doubts about the potential benefits of training for this group of employees: 
‘It is unskilled work. [..] And then, you are really lucky if a few people have some 
administrative skills, then they could become some sort of planner. But there are only a 
few of them.’ 
10 
 
A union official also acknowledged the problem of employee reluctance to participate in 
training, but offered explanations based on factors external to the employee. One explanation 
pertained to employability programs that require employees to invest their own time and/or 
money: employees with a low income and many dependents simply have little time nor money 
available to invest in training. The union official also offered a second explanation pertaining to 
employees with previous negative experience with formal schooling: 
‘And just for categories of employees for whom it would be very important, who are 
near the bottom of the labor market: they did not have much success in training before 
and for that reason, they are not very inclined to participate in training.’  
The fear factor caused by negative school experiences was confirmed by a consultant working 
at  an  employers’  association.  In  addition,  a  Member  of  Parliament  suggested  that  for  some  
people, the concept of employability is too far removed from their daily life experience: 
‘It depends upon your background. A few months ago I was at Corus [a steel plant in 
Ijmuiden, part of Mittal Steel], where thousands of workers are going to be made 
redundant. For many of these people, this is their first job and their only job and they 
may already have worked there for twenty or thirty years. These people become totally 
frightened when they think they have to leave the company. Employability  means 
nothing to them: “I  don’t  want  employability,  I  simply  want  to  continue  working here.”’ 
In contrast, she suggested that employability is much more natural for someone in a position 
like her own, with a tertiary degree and a varied career: 
‘I approve of things such as lifelong learning, further training and changing your job 
within the company once in a while, it keeps you fresh. I myself am an example of 
employability.’ 
Intensifying control or diminishing protection are not obvious solutions for dealing with 
problems such as fear. As an example, the union official quoted above felt that a solution for 
training anxiety was recognition or certification of previously acquired competencies or skills, 
because this made it possible to build employability without employees knowing it:  
‘So not by giving them formal training, not even informal training; not by sending them 
to an in-company training course. No, through assignments and a change of workplace 
while presenting it to them as just one of these things that they have to do. In this way 
they can build competencies, and you can do this in a gradual manner. And if you assess 
previously acquired competencies every three years, you will find that competencies 
have been added.’ 
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Thus analyses of the perceived passivity problem can be placed in a spectrum from blaming the 
individual to blaming structure. How actors assess the passivity problem, is relevant for 
whether they see employability enhancement policy as a matter of giving someone a hand or 
giving them a push. Or, in terms of the contradictions discussed above, whether a given scheme 
is likely to be seen as disempowering because it involves too much control or a is too risky an 
adventure. 
Among the interviewees blaming the individual were representatives  of  employer’s  
organizations, civil servants and right-wing politicians. Among those who blame structure were 
union representatives, one collective bargaining official working for a company, and left-wing 
politicians. 
 
Grand designs: contested control  
Apart from perceived employee passivity, a key theme emerging from the interviews was a 
perceived shortfall in investment directed at facilitating bold cross-labor market movement. 
Sector funds tended to restrict training to that which was relevant in their sector/industry 
rather than provide training that would allow employees to shift to another industry. This was 
because the sector funds collected their money from the employers within the sector. The 
concern was that these employers, the managers of sector funds and the union representatives 
involved were not enthusiastic about paying for training that would ultimately benefit 
employers in other sectors.  
There was also some disappointment about the extent to which employability clauses in 
collective  agreements,  designed  to  increase  employees’  mobility,  had  the  intended  effect.  In  
practice, the non job-specific training that was required for this was found to be significantly 
lagging behind job-related training. The impression was that union officials often did not make 
the considerable effort required to work out the details of collectively bargained agreements 
and to monitor implementation. Finally, there were doubts about whether line managers found 
the employability issue important enough to devote time to it, and whether their desire to 
retain good employees in their teams did not get in the way. 
The main underlying theme was a collective action problem: everyone agreed that a well-
trained, versatile workforce is in the common interest, but: individual employers expressed less 
enthusiasm for training workers who could run off to a competitor; sector fund managers were 
not exactly thrilled at the prospect of subsidizing cross-sector training; employers were not 
happy about paying into sector funds that could cause employees to leave the company; and 
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middle managers did not like to see their best people developing in such a way that they would 
move on. 
The assessment that collective action dilemmas were hampering investment in bold cross-labor 
market mobility prompted discussion about a possible comprehensive, institutional system. 
Comprehensive because this would make investment in cross-labor market mobility less 
dependent on the decisions of individual employers or sector fund managers and institutional 
because this would formalize employability arrangements to a greater extent than the largely 
unmonitored clauses in collective agreements.  
A  comprehensive  system  could  be  legitimized  by  the  system’s  contribution  to  an  improved  
functioning of the labor market at large and to the skill and knowledge base of the economy. 
Apart from a solution to the collective action problem, a comprehensive system also offers a 
logical answer to the question of how to increase employee participation in training, because it 
would create institutional pressure. Thus, different reasons existed for thinking in a similar 
direction. 
The quest for a comprehensive institutional system involved professionals whose job, more or 
less, was to raise ambition levels and generate ideas. One body that was active in this was the 
Project Directorate Lifelong Learning, a task forced filled with civil servants from various 
government departments. One of its activities was to set up a think tank consisting of external 
experts. The Social and Economic Council, particularly the independent political advisors, i.e. 
members not connected to employers’  associations  or  unions,  worked  on  developing  advisory  
reports. Advisory reports were also created by  staff members of the Dutch Labor Foundation 
and the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy. The system designs suggested by these 
reports included elements such as training vouchers or individual learning accounts 
underpinned by learning rights, the right to sabbatical leave, and a fiscal stimulus. 
Compared to the arrangements contained in collective agreements (1995-2009), the proposals 
for an improved, comprehensive and institutionalized employability enhancing policy entailed 
increased control over employees. For example, such control is present in the logic of a system 
in which money is set aside for each employee to provide for training. To the employee, this is 
visible in the form of an individual training account or a set of training vouchers. An unused 
amount of training money or an unused voucher symbolizes a missed opportunity. The idea was 
that this money should come from both employers and employees, thus an employee would 
view leaving a voucher unused as wasting his or her own money. This logic can be seen as 
constituting a light form of control.  
13 
 
Beyond this base line of control, opinions diverged. This is to be expected, given that a 
perceived lack of employee enthusiasm for further training was approached with a mix of moral 
judgment and causal explanation. Moral judgment lays the groundwork for a system with 
stricter control, while causal explanation provides the basis for creating a system with more 
caution in this respect. Among union representatives, who offered causal explanations, there 
was some willingness to increase the level of control in employability policy. One trade union 
official felt that maybe employees should be confronted directly and that pressure should be 
applied to coax them to training. Policy makers observed that some unions were prepared to 
discuss some form of obligatory participation  in training, but found it difficult to speak about 
sanctions. Employers’  representatives  tended  to  be  more  adamant  about  employee  obligations,  
but less so about new obligations for employers. Expert opinions were mixed. The Think Tank 
Lifelong Learning proposed a supplement to the legal basis of employment contracts in the 
form  of  an  obligation  for  employers  to  offer  employees  ‘the  opportunity  to  participate  in  
training that is necessary for maintaining and further developing professionals skills, and that is 
oriented towards the development of the firm and the labor market,’  and  an  obligation  for  the  
employee to participate in such training that is made available by the employer (Denktank 
Leren en Werken 2009: 43). However, experts were also sensitive to a possible 
counterproductive effect of increased control. Independent political advisors in the Social and 
Economic Council attempted to convince employers that study leave:   
‘offers the most advantages when you regulate it the least because employees will not 
only recover from work pressures but are most likely to learn things that will prove to be 
valuable to the employer.’ 
To summarize: in the thinking about an institutional system that would enable and push 
employees to shape their careers through bolder movements across the labor market, there 
was a drift towards greater control. This movement included representatives of employer 
organizations, experts and union representatives. Union representatives, in particular, strove to 
limit greater control to normative control. 
Grand designs: contested risk  
The risk contradiction, i.e. the contradiction between ambition and the risk of programmed 
failure, was also evident in the discourse about the envisioned system that would take 
employability policy to a higher level. From the point of view of empowerment as a goal in and 
of itself, failure is most disempowering when individual responsibility has been emphasized. 
Thus increased personal responsibility makes avoiding failure more urgent. Consultants working 
on employability proposals discovered that their idea of increasing employees’  individual  
responsibility was found acceptable as long as they combined it with a plea for more resources: 
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‘If you maintained sufficient balance in the text, that employers played a role by 
providing means to facilitate employees in this, those sorts of debates. It was fun to see 
that that sort of thinking was ripe to be able to be written up.’ (social policy consultant) 
Nevertheless, union representatives remained worried about programmed failure for certain 
categories of workers: 
‘For a couple of years now, all political parties, from left to right, have emphasized 
individual responsibility. But the leftwing parties, and we as a trade union, are vigilant 
about situations in which people cannot bear this responsibility. We too feel that people 
have their own responsibility to do everything that they can to stay employed [..] but we 
note that not everyone can bear this personal responsibility.’ (union official) 
A final controversy developed when employers started lobbying the government to abolish or 
diminish  employees’  dismissal  protection.  In  the  Netherlands,  employers  can  normally  only  
dismiss workers after either obtaining permission from a state agency, the Center for Work and 
Income, whereby the necessity to dismiss must be proven, or by going to court. The latter 
procedure tends to involve monetary compensation in the form of redundancy payments. It 
should be noted that part-time workers have the same protection that full-time workers enjoy 
in this regard.  
Employers made it clear to the unions that they would only be willing to engage in further 
discussions about employability if the rules regarding dismissal protection would also be 
discussed. At that point in time, as one respondent put it, the debates about employability and 
about dismissal protection became intertwined. Employers, experts and civil servants began 
advocating the idea of changing the dismissal rules in such a way that, in the event of a 
dismissal, a company  that  was  able  to  show  it  had  invested  in  an  individuals’  employability  
would be required to pay less financial compensation. The same would apply if the employer 
had offered training, but the employee had refused to participate. In this way, dismissed 
employees found not to have invested in their employability would be punished by withholding 
of monetary compensation for their redundancy. This would create a stick directed at 
employees reluctant to participate in training.  
The  logic  presented  by  proponents  of  a  shift  from  protection  to  enhancement  of  employees’  
employability was as follows: although employees would be less protected, training was a way 
to compensate for this because it would make them better equipped to move into new jobs. 
The assumption was that such training would provide a level of security that was at least 
equivalent to the level of security provided by existing dismissal protection. There are problems 
with this logic, however. One problem is that the people  whose security would decrease as a 
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result of decreased protection, are not necessarily the same people who would gain security by 
investing in their employability. This point can be seen in the union reaction: 
‘We say that when you do this, you take away a lot of protection from many people who 
can not bear this much personal responsibility.’ (union official) 
A second problem is that this proposition is based on the assumption that investments in 
further training significantly enhance work security. Some experts found this to be a 
questionable assumption, but such doubts had not been strong enough for them to give up the 
idea. Even stronger doubts were voiced by trade union confederation FNV leader Wilna Wind, 
who noted that the idea of replacing dismissal protection with employability investments was 
attractive in theory, but does not line up with practical reality. She added that the discussions 
on employability had been going on for ten years, but that not much had materialized in reality 
(Kammer 2007). 
The plan to link investment in employability with a decrease of protection eventually failed 
after a major setback in 2007 when the social-democratic cabinet ministers opposed it, 
apparently for electoral reasons, and threatened to cause the government to fall. We can see 
this as a case that shows that fear that an empowerment scheme will send vulnerable people 
on a path towards a programmed failure can have a limiting effect on the ambition level. 
Concluding notes and discussion 
Employability policy in the Netherlands can be analyzed as a balancing game that is structured 
by general contradictions inherent in empowerment. One of these contradictions is the control 
contradiction, which is the contradiction between autonomy and control. Employability is about 
employees taking control of their careers, but as Garsten and Jacobsson (2004a: 14) note, 
employability policy also seems to fit into a trend of controlling people more effectively through 
an  ’internalization of control’.  It  is  an  example  of  Foucault’s  ‘conduct  of  conduct’,  one  of  the  
‘technologies  of  the  self’,  i.e.  ‘techniques  that  empower  and  activate  forms  of  agency’  (Garsten 
and Jacobsson (2004b: 276-278). For  those  on  the  employers’  side  in  this debate, the control 
contradiction did not appear to be salient. This was different for the unions. Initially, union 
representatives chose to ignore the concept of employability. This exit option corresponds to 
what the critical literature on employability describes as people shutting themselves off from 
self-governance, and tends to present as the only alternative to uncritical acceptance (Garsten 
and Jacobsson 2004b: 281). 
That voice is also an option only became apparent once when the unions stopped seeing 
employability as a managerial control device, and defined it as an employee’s  ability  to  defend  
her/himself. This shift was analogous to the debate on flexibility in Sweden. In this debate, 
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union leaders chose to define flexibility as freedom for employees rather than as freedom for 
employers (Engstrand 2007). Subsequent union involvement in the Netherlands entailed 
participation in the development of employability programs that, while putting normative 
pressure on employees, stopped short of imposing mandatory arrangements. The argument 
hinged on the assessment why employees had been more passive than the designers of 
employability programs had hoped. Structural explanations for this provided a basis for 
advocating light control; protagonists who explained perceived passivity as an individual, moral 
shortcoming, tended to favor heavier forms of control. 
The second general contradiction of empowerment, the contradiction between ambition and 
the risk of programmed failure, played a role in the debate about a possible new 
comprehensive system that would simultaneously: 1) sidestep the collective action problems 
hampering investment in cross-industry employability; 2) put more pressure on employees to 
participate in training; 3) legitimize a decrease in dismissal protection; and 4) for optimistic 
policy experts, remedy the security loss incurred by a decrease of dismissal protection. This line 
of thinking proved vulnerable to doubts as to whether such a system would not place 
unrealistic demands on parts of the working population. 
The final general contradiction of empowerment, the targeting contradiction, i.e. the 
contradiction between focus and stigmatization, is expressed in the critical literature on 
employability in the form of a concern that the concept can function as an instrument for 
classification (Garsten and Jacobsson 2004a). Bollérot (2001) explains that this mechanism can 
cause an employability program to have an effect opposite of the one that was intended. In the 
case of the employability debate in the Netherlands, this concern led to a preference for 
employability programs  positioned as beneficial for broad categories of employees, not 
specifically as beneficial for employees who are slated for dismissal. 
Obviously, employability is only one of many empowerment frames. However, it may be seen 
as a critical case showing that such a frame need not necessarily be a tool that obscures 
control; it can open up a debate. This seems dependent on the  condition that those to be 
empowered are represented by a powerful actor, or at least an actor enjoying strong support 
from the institutional framework. In Netherlands, the latter is the case. Although only 20 per 
cent of employees were union members in 2011, a decrease from 28 per cent in 1997, the 
unions play an important role in the coordinated market economy. 80 per cent of all employees 
are covered by a collectively bargained agreement. In the central institutions of the labor 
market and socio-economic policy, employers and unions discuss both long-term policy and the 
agendas for upcoming rounds of collective bargaining. In this manner, an exclusive managerial 
perspective is avoided. This seems in contrast to the UK, a country in which the employability 
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discourse was also strong. Analyses of the latter suggest that is was unitary, and dominated by 
a managerial perspective (Hallier and Butts, 1999; Morley, 2001; Brown, Hesketh and Williams, 
2003; McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005). This underpins the relevance of the institutional framework 
as an underlying condition for the development of a debate structured by the contradictions of 
empowerment. 
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